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Around 1990, trade unions in both Norway and Denmark moved away from their previous 
hostile stance, and started actively to promote occupational pensions. Over time, full coverage 
of occupational pensions was achieved in both countries, yet with different scopes, degrees of 
risk-sharing and modes of governance. Why did both countries go through similar 
institutional changes, and why were the outcomes still so different? The roads to full coverage 
were different: In Denmark, this was achieved through wage bargaining; in Norway, through 
mandating. Denmark developed far more collectivistic schemes than Norway, but recent 
developments indicate convergence: efforts are being made in Norway to develop 
encompassing schemes more similar to the Danish ones, while the Danish system appears to 
be moving in a more individual direction. In both countries, strong trade union branches have 
at critical junctures forged alliances with their employer counterparts at the expense of trade 
union solidarity. Both mandatory and negotiated schemes thus have the potential to be sources 
of solidarity as well as of self-interest within the union movement. 
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Introduction 
As late as the early 1980s, the trade union movements in both Norway and Denmark were 
highly sceptical if not directly hostile towards occupational pensions. However, some time in 
the late 1980s or early 1990s their attitudes and strategies changed fundamentally, and they 
started actively to promote occupational pensions. Over time, full coverage of occupational 
pensions was achieved in both countries. The schemes’ scope, degree of risk-sharing and 
mode of governance however vary considerably. Why did both countries go through similar 
institutional changes, and why were the outcomes still so different? These are the questions 
we aim to answer in this article. The empirical analysis is guided by three research questions: 
a) how can the change of union strategies be explained, b) what form did it take, and c) what 
implications has it had for the scope and nature of occupational pension provision in the two 
countries? 
The existing literature contains two broad strands theorising about the dynamics of 
occupational pensions: a labour relations perspective and a welfare state/retirement provision 
perspective. The labour relations perspective emphasises that occupational pensions are a 
form of labour remuneration. From this perspective, it is argued that unions might prefer 
bargaining for occupational pensions in order to help their members gain access to the 
associated tax subsidies (Blinder, 1982) and/or because unions tend to give priority to the 
interests of older workers (Freeman, 1985). A third possible motive for unions to engage in 
the promotion of occupational pension schemes is membership recruitment and organisational 
interests of the unions themselves (Therborn, 1986; Pedersen, 1990). From this perspective, 
unions might have reason to prefer occupational pensions to earnings-related public pensions. 
The welfare state perspective instead emphasises that occupational pensions are a 
vehicle for retirement provision and hence a close substitute for public pensions. 
Consequently, the dynamics of occupational pensions should be sought in the social policy 
domain. Influential welfare state theorists have tended to entertain a dualistic view of public 
and private occupational pensions, associating the former with a strong capacity for 
redistribution and risk-sharing and seeing the latter as highly inegalitarian and a manifestation 
of unfettered market forces (see for instance Titmuss, 1955; Korpi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Thus, a common assumption in this literature has been that (social democratic) trade 
unions at the end of the day will prefer public pensions to occupational pensions and only 
seek to develop the latter as a second-best solution if political power relations prohibit an 
expansion of public pensions. 
This sceptical view of occupational pensions in the welfare policy literature is 
challenged in more recent contributions that instead emphasise the institutional diversity of 
this form of retirement provision (see Shalev, 1996; Ebbinghaus, 2011). The point, most 
explicitly argued by Trampusch (2007), is that occupational pension schemes can incorporate 
a significant degree of effective solidarity in the form of risk-sharing and power-sharing 
depending on their coverage, the mechanisms for determining contribution rates and the 
specific architecture of the schemes. This means that there is considerable potential for trade 
unions to further social policy objectives by actively engaging in struggles over the scope and 
nature of occupational pensions. In this context, much attention has been given to the 
distinction between defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) schemes, where the 
former are seen as the natural preference of wage-earners and unions. In this article, however, 
we will argue that this distinction is as much an oversimplification as the public-private 
divide, and that there is wide variation among DC schemes in their inclusiveness and degree 
of risk-sharing. 
A strong trend in contemporary social policy studies is the study of institutional 
stability and change. In this literature, occupational pensions figure as paradigmatic examples 
of how changes in public welfare programmes can be driven by developments in the non-state 
sector (Hacker, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). As the argument goes, in many cases it is 
much easier to establish new institutions ‘on the edges of old ones’ (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005: 31) than to change the existing institutions. This perspective draws attention to the 
interplay of various parts of the pension system, and to the potential occupational pensions 
have to influence other parts of the pension system. 
As for our choice of cases, both Norway and Denmark are generally considered as 
belonging to the Nordic family of social democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990), 
and they both feature strong trade union movements and a tradition for centralised wage 
bargaining (Hall and Soskice, 2001). If there is a potential for effective union involvement 
and the creation of fairly solidaristic systems of occupational provision, few cases would be 
more favourable. At the same time, the two countries diverge in both their public pension 
systems and in their industrial relations traditions, as we will outline below. This constellation 
of similarities and differences makes the two countries interesting cases for comparison. 
We divide the chronological account of developments into two phases. In the first 
phase starting in the mid-1980s in Denmark and in the mid-1990s in Norway, unions departed 
from their previous anti-occupational-pensions stance and started pushing to expand coverage 
of occupational pension schemes. In both countries these efforts culminated in a radical 
expansion of the coverage of occupational pension schemes, but through very different 
mechanisms – in Denmark as a result of collective wage bargaining and in Norway as a result 
of mandating. In both countries the expansion of coverage came in the form of defined 
contribution (DC) schemes that now dominate the occupational pension markets. 
In the second phase we see continuous developments in the nature of occupational 
pension schemes and conflicts involving issues like union bargaining rights, savings levels, 
risk coverage and risk pooling as well as union influence over pension capital and the 
management of pension plans. In Denmark, comparatively solidaristic and collectivistic DC 
schemes have over time become more individualised, while Norwegian trade unions have 
struggled with employers, the finance industry and among themselves to achieve a higher 
degree of collective control and risk-sharing in what was at the outset a system of employer-
controlled and highly individualised schemes. 
Before we embark on the analysis of occupational pension politics in the two 
successive phases, we give a brief outline of the distinctive historical and institutional legacies 
of occupational pensions in the two countries. 
Historical context 
Denmark has a long tradition of occupational pension provision that predates the national 
pension scheme. Civil servants were covered by special pension arrangements financed on a 
pay-as-you go basis and offering an old-age pension (a deferred wage) of about two-thirds of 
the previous salary. In 1937, legislation on private sector occupational pension schemes was 
reformed, requiring them to be fully funded. The schemes were taxed in accordance with a 
standard exempt-exempt-tax (EET) regime, i.e. contributions and returns on savings were 
exempt from taxation, while benefits were taxed during the retirement phase. In order to 
qualify for this favourable tax treatment, employers were not necessarily obliged to cover 
their entire workforce, and could opt for lump-sum payments rather than annuities. In 1982, a 
new tax on the real returns on occupational pension savings was introduced, moving the 
system from an EET to an exempt-tax-tax (ETT) regime (Kangas et al., 2010). 
The first public pension system was introduced in 1891, when municipalities were 
required to offer means-tested benefits to elderly citizens. In the 1920s and 1930s, the national 
old-age pension scheme was expanded and means-testing streamlined. A universal flat-rate 
benefit to all elderly was introduced in 1957, but unlike its Scandinavian neighbours, 
Denmark never completely abolished means-testing in the public pension system, and also 
never introduced an earnings-related second tier to the statutory public pension system 
(Vesterø-Jensen, 1985). 
Despite the lack of a public earnings-related second tier, the overall coverage with 
occupational pension schemes remained relatively low, reaching around 35 per cent in the 
mid-1980s. While collective occupational DC schemes had been set up in the 1950s and 
1960s for particular professional groups in the public sector (like nurses, doctors and lawyers) 
as a replacement for the traditional civil servant DB scheme, lower-skilled white-collar 
workers in the public sector were left without supplementary pension cover. In the private 
sector only a small minority of employees – primarily white collar workers – were covered. . 
Similarly, in Norway, occupational pensions predate national public pensions by 
several decades. The earliest regulations of private sector occupational pension schemes came 
in connection with a tax law of 1911. In 1917, a comprehensive occupational pension scheme 
for civil servants and other categories of state employees (Statens pensjonskasse) was 
established by law, offering old-age pensions at a replacement rate of two-thirds of the final 
salary. In the same year, the conditions for preferential treatment of private sector 
occupational pensions were further specified. To qualify for the preferential (EET) tax 
treatment, company schemes had to be DB, fully funded, and managed by an insurance 
company or a pension trust independent of the sponsoring company. From 1952, it was 
further required that company occupational pensions cover the entire workforce and not aim 
for higher replacement rates for higher-paid than for lower-paid staff (Hippe and Pedersen, 
1992). 
The first national public pensions in Norway was a means-tested scheme introduced in 
1936. Means-testing was completely abolished in 1959, so that all the elderly from the age of 
70 would receive a flat-rate benefit. Occupational pension plans were from then on allowed to 
be ‘integrated with’ (take account of) expected benefits from the public system, and adapted 
to the role of supplementing rather than replacing benefits from the national pension scheme. 
Their role was further limited when a relatively ambitious earnings-related second tier (of 
Swedish inspiration) was added to the public pension system in 1967. 
A striking difference between the Norwegian and the Danish trade union movements 
in this early phase concerns their respective attitudes towards state earnings-related pensions: 
many Danish trade unions opposed such pensions as a matter of principle (Vesterø-Jensen, 
1985), while a unified movement in Norway warmly welcomed the introduction of a second 
tier of earnings-related pensions in 1967, seeing it as the realisation of a longstanding demand 
for equal access to earnings-related pensions for all categories as wage-earners (Pedersen, 
1990). In the wake of the 1967 reform, LO gave up its demand for negotiated occupational 
pensions, and even closed down a rudimentary scheme that had been introduced in 1961 
(Hippe and Pedersen, 1996). 
Nevertheless, public sector occupational pensions continued to exist, as did company 
schemes in the private sector. Overall coverage with occupational pension schemes continued 
to grow during the 1970s and 1980s, partly due to public sector employment growth and 
partly to expanding coverage with company-specific DB schemes in the private sector. Such 
schemes were comparatively cheap to establish at that time thanks to high nominal and real 
interest rates (Hippe and Pedersen, 1996). 
Phase 1: struggles to expand coverage 
In the late 1980s (Denmark) or early 1990s (Norway), trade unions changed their position on 
occupational pensions, moving from being basically hostile to actively engaging in efforts to 
expand coverage with occupational pension schemes. In both countries the process was 
characterised by internal conflicts between different union branches and between national 
union branches and the peak organisation, the LO. 
 
Denmark 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Danish trade unions were either disinterested in or directly 
hostile towards occupational pensions and the associated tax privileges offered to this form of 
savings. LO’s position on occupational pensions started to change in the mid-1980s.The low 
coverage among LO’s core constituencies in the private sector was increasingly seen as a 
serious problem. Growing awareness about the inadequacy of public pensions, particularly for 
dual-earner households, was an important part of the explanation. Another motive behind the 
reorientation were the aspirations of the LO leadership to advance the idea of industrial 
democracy through union control over pension funds. The latter could also help boost unions’ 
recruitment potential, image and administrative resources. 
In 1985, a working group within the LO proposed a new policy approach favouring 
the expansion of occupational pensions to cover the entire Danish workforce (LO, 1985). At 
this point, the Danish LO insisted that initiatives at the bargaining table should be backed by 
legislation in order to secure the enrolment of the entire (private sector) workforce in one 
unified scheme (von Nordheim Nielsen, 1996). 
The liberal-conservative government of the time responded by announcing its 
willingness to support LO’s demand for occupational pensions on the condition that the LO 
accepted wage restraint in return for pension contributions. In 1987, a historic tripartite 
agreement was reached (Den Danske Regering, 1987), and analytical work was initiated on 
ways to expand occupational pension coverage to the entire Danish workforce. However, the 
tripartite negotiations broke down in 1989. One of the reasons seems to be that the LO 
overextended its negotiating position by insisting on a general scheme with a centralised fund 
in which the trade union movement would be in charge of investment policies (von Nordheim 
Nielsen, 1996). This was seen as unacceptable by the employers’ associations who in addition 
were sceptical whether the LO had sufficient control over its national union branches to 
actually be able to deliver the necessary wage restraint in return for employer pension 
contributions. 
In the wage negotiations in the private sector two years later, the Metal Workers 
Union and the Union for Unskilled Workers (the ‘SID’, now ‘3F’) broke with the LO position 
and sided with their employer counterparts to set up a series of industry-wide DC schemes in 
the construction, transport, trade and services sectors (Due and Madsen, 2005). The 
manufacturing sector followed suit in 1993. 
In the following years, unions and their employer counterparts managed to develop 
these new embryonic schemes into a comprehensive system of negotiated industry-wide 
occupational pension schemes – resulting in an overall coverage with DC occupational 
pension schemes of about 80 to 90 per cent of the Danish employed workforce. The new 
schemes were in most cases controlled by the social partners in collaboration and managed by 
pension funds organised as special-purpose insurance companies. As a result, non-profit 
providers account for some 85 per cent of all private pensions in Denmark. 
It should be emphasised that this outcome – the establishment of a network of 
industry-wide schemes in collaboration with the corresponding employer counterparts – was 
in direct conflict to the primary position of the LO leadership that had insisted on the creation 
of a unitary scheme for the entire private sector under union control and backed by legislation. 
The pension rebellion by national union branches against LO as a peak organisation not only 
changed the Danish pension system, but also marked a shift of power within the LO in which 
national union branches took full control of wage bargaining at the expense of the LO’s 





In the decades following the introduction of an earnings-related tier to the public pension 
system in 1967, trade union officials and activists expected the public scheme to eventually 
make supplementary occupational pension coverage redundant for the vast majority of wage-
earners. Attempts to strengthen occupational pension schemes were seen as potentially 
threatening the legitimacy of the public pension system. 
However, the unions’ positions towards occupational pensions shifted gradually 
during the 1990s. An important driver was that replacement rates turned out to be lower than 
foreseen when the system was introduced. Pension rights were for a long period in the 1970s 
and 1980s not fully indexed to wages, and, as in Denmark, the inadequacy of the pension 
system to provide income security for dual-earner couples became increasingly obvious. 
Instead of addressing these issues, a minor retrenchment reform with cuts in earnings-related 
pensions was introduced under a Labour government in 1992. These cuts in the public old-age 
pension system made it clear to trade unions that the public scheme would never become 
generous enough to make supplementary occupational pensions redundant for ordinary 
workers. At the same time, coverage with occupational pensions in the private sector was 
limited to just half of the workforce. 
Against this background, the LO leadership started voicing a more positive attitude 
towards occupational pensions for its private sector members in the 1990s, but without 
directly taking action. As in Denmark, the largest private sector union branch, Fellesforbundet 
(which includes the metalworkers), took the reins into its own hands in the mid-1990s by 
starting to lobby for the introduction of favourable tax rules for DC schemes established and 
financed by individual employers. Fellesforbundet saw this as the only realistic route to 
achieve higher coverage among its members. 
Fellesforbundet’s demand for tax concessions for DC schemes was met with 
scepticism or outright resistance – both by the Labour Party and by other union branches 
affiliated to the LO. The public sector unions in particular feared that the introduction of DC 
schemes in the private sector could undermine the generous DB schemes found in the public 
sector. Due to these internal tensions, LO was forced to keep a low profile on the issue. The 
employers’ organisations and the finance industry however eagerly supported 
Fellesforbundet. During the 1990s, DB schemes became increasingly costly to employers due 
to decreasing interest rates and increasing longevity. Expansion of occupational pensions in 
the private sector had therefore come to a halt, and many employers were eager to find 
alternatives to the expensive DB schemes. The finance industry, on its part, was keen to find 
ways to expand the pension market that had halted at precisely the moment where more 
capital was needed to cater for increased longevity. 
In April 1998, Fellesforbundet and its employer counterpart (TBL) sent a letter to the 
Prime minister asking for the introduction of a DC option, and (interestingly enough) 
demanding concessions for female employees by requiring pension providers to use gender-
neutral mortality tables (Fellesforbundet og Teknologibedriftenes landsforbund, 1998). This 
demand was met with broad political support, and a new law offering tax deductions also for 
DC arrangements was passed in 1999. 
Taking effect from 2001, the new legislation followed the historical tradition of 
detailed regulations, but in other aspects was radical in its break with existing DB schemes. It 
assumed DC schemes to be purely individual savings accounts during the accrual phase, only 
requiring insurance coverage of future premiums in case the employee became disabled 
before reaching retirement. It was left up to the employer to choose insurance company or 
portfolio manager and to cover the administration costs. Upon retirement, the accumulated 
assets must be paid out in annual benefits for a minimum period of 10 years (lump-sum 
payments are not allowed). For the payment phase, the employer is further allowed a choice 
between savings accounts with fixed annual payments over fixed number of years (minimum 
10) and a conversion into insurance contracts/proper annuities. In 2003, the law was amended, 
requiring companies to pay higher contributions for female employees if and when the 
annuity option (with gender specific annuity calculations) is chosen. This was done to ensure 
that the annual benefits will be the same for women and men with a given earnings history. 
The 2001 Act did not have the effect its proponents had hoped for. The rise in 
coverage rates was sluggish, with growth coming almost exclusively at the expense of 
traditional DB schemes. As a reaction, attempts were made by Fellesforbundet (this time with 
LO support) to negotiate a collective, industry-wide agreement requiring employers to 
establish company schemes in both the 2002 and 2003 negotiations. However, in contrast to 
their Danish peers, the peak employer organisation (NHO) and the affiliated employer 
association for manufacturing industries (TBL) firmly refused to negotiate occupational 
pensions as part of the national wage-bargaining process. In 2004, however, the parties – 
again – sent a joint letter to the government, asking for a law to make occupational pensions 
mandatory in the private sector. The timing was perfect: with a major retrenchment reform of 
the National Insurance old-age pension scheme underway, the government hoped that 
accommodating the LO on occupational pensions would help ensure support for the pending 
reform. Possibly the employers’ organisations shared this hope and, moreover, figured that a 
mandate requiring modest contribution rates would primarily represent a burden on smaller 
companies outside the collective bargaining system. Furthermore, mandating allowed the 
employers’ organisations to remain steadfast in their rejection of negotiating occupational 
pensions at the central level. Contrary to the situation in Denmark, the Norwegian 
occupational pension market is dominated by traditional for-profit insurance companies, and 
the life-insurance industry embraced the mandate, since it promised a market expansion that 
voluntary employer decisions had not been able to bring about.  
The so-called OTP Act that came into force in 2006 mandated all private sector 
employers with at least two employees to establish a company occupational pension scheme 
with a minimum contribution of 2 per cent of annual salaries between a minimum threshold 
and an upper ceiling at about two times the average full-time wage. The mandate left it up to 
companies to choose between DB and DC schemes and, obviously, contribution rates could 
be set higher than the minimum level.1 
As a direct consequence of the Act, coverage of occupational pension schemes in 
Norway became virtually complete by 2006. However, practically all the new schemes were 
highly individualised DC schemes without insurance components and with only minimum 
contribution rates (Veland and Hippe, 2008). 
Phase 2: debates and conflicts about scheme features 
As we have seen, (almost) complete coverage with occupational pension schemes was 
achieved in Denmark in the early 1990s and in Norway in 2006. In both countries the vehicle 
for this expansion of coverage was DC schemes in which the financial responsibility of 
employers is strictly limited to the payment of fixed annual contributions. However, the 
nature of the DC schemes that emerged after the struggle for increased coverage differed 
widely between the two countries. The Danish schemes were at the outset relatively 
collectivistic with strong union involvement and extensive risk coverage and risk-sharing 
among members of each scheme, while the Norwegian DC schemes were typically very 
modest and highly individualised. 
The second phase is dominated by struggles over the nature, scope and governance of 
the schemes, with tensions within the trade union movements becoming more pronounced. 
 
Denmark 
The schemes established and developed in Denmark during the 1990s were organised as 
insurance schemes offering risk coverage for disability and survivors’ benefits in addition to 
old-age (lifelong) annuities. In most schemes contributions were immediately converted to a 
‘with profits’ insurance contract based on a fixed guaranteed return rate. The collective and 
semi-obligatory nature of the Danish schemes vis-à-vis individual companies and their 
employees made it possible to base the annuity conversion and risk premiums on unisex 
mortality tables. Since 1996 gender neutrality has been obligatory for Danish pension 
providers, implying quite significant redistribution from men to women among the members 
of each scheme – as long as they provide lifelong benefits. Typically, there was no individual 
investment choice, little or no choice with respect to insurance coverage and the benefit 
profile. Workers were affiliated with a particular scheme without the right to move pension 
assets between schemes. Most schemes operated with a system to level out fluctuations in 
annual returns on the scheme’s total assets. 
In sum, we can say that, despite being of the DC type with employers’ responsibility 
limited to paying fixed contribution rates, the Danish occupational pension schemes allowed 
for significant risk-sharing and redistribution among members of each scheme – both between 
genders and across cohorts. While this type of risk-sharing is strictly limited to members of 
each scheme, more comprehensive risk-sharing is arguably provided by the extensive use of 
income-testing in the public pension system (Sørensen, 2015). 
In the high inflation environment of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, the pension 
providers had few problems honouring insurance contracts based on a high guaranteed 
nominal return rate. Also contributing to the sustainability of these types of scheme was the 
fact that the growth in longevity among the Danish population was comparatively slow up 
until the turn of the Millennium. 
However, the external conditions started to change in the mid-1990s with the advent of 
decreasing and – as it turned out – persistently low interest rates and rapidly increasing 
longevity. These two trends both increased the capital needed to fund the promised benefit 
stream, and put the Danish pension providers under severe financial pressure. Signs to this 
effect became visible already in the 1990s and were further exposed by the ‘dotcom’ crisis in 
the late 1990s, the stock market crisis in 2003–2004 – and later the 2009 financial crisis. 
The responses have developed gradually, and they have come from the state and 
pension providers as well as the social partners. The Danish financial supervisory authority 
reacted by tightening regulation. The most important steps were to lower the maximum 
allowed guarantee rate for new contracts (in steps to currently 1 per cent), to mandate market 
rate valuation on the liability side (2002), and to introduce stress testing in the solvency 
assessment, adopting a mortality benchmark framework (2011). The target of these efforts is 
to safeguard members’ rights and ensure the financial sustainability of pension schemes. 
Partly as a result of demographic and economic pressures and the associated changes 
in financial regulations – but also in part responding to demands for greater flexibility from 
wage-earners – the Danish DC schemes have changed towards more individualisation and 
reduced risk coverage and risk-sharing between scheme members (Finanstilsynet, 2017). 
The dominance of the classic guaranteed DC insurance approach has diminished, 
giving way to greater diversity. Pension plans with uniform, collective investment portfolios 
and mechanisms to smooth fluctuations in annual returns on capital have become the 
exception. Many providers now offer individual choice between different risk profiles and a 
few even offer members products with individual investment choice. 
On the benefits side, the traditional insurance approach has increasingly been replaced 
by an approach based on annuitisation at retirement or combinations of fixed-term 
withdrawals and annuities commencing at a relatively high age. In 2014 only 57 per cent of 
total pension funds were still dedicated to plans offering lifelong annuities, while 28 per cent 
and 15 per cent belonged respectively to schemes offering fixed term payments, or lump-sum 
benefits (Finanstilsynet, 2017: 5). Limited sharing of longevity risk has reduced the degree of 
redistribution in favour of female scheme members. 
Even after these changes, the Danish occupational pension market remains 
collectivistic in the sense that participation is compulsory for individual employers and 
employees and contribution rates are determined by collective agreements. Trade unions have, 
in collaboration with their employer counterparts, played a key role in setting up the Danish 
occupational schemes, in raising their contribution rates and in adapting their designs to 
changing economic and demographic conditions. Hence, many schemes now have 
substantially higher contribution rates than originally anticipated, with a view to compensate 
for increasing longevity and low interest rates. 
In recent years, unions and pension industry representatives have started to question 
the interaction between occupational pensions and the public pension system. The strong role 
of income testing in the public pension system is an important risk-sharing feature, but it also 
implies that the marginal gain from increased occupational pension savings is seriously 
curtailed for large segments of wage-earners (Sørensen, 2015). From this perspective, one can 
argue that that the wage restraint offered by LO unions in the 1990s in return for pension 
contributions was of little use insofar as increases in future private benefits are to a large 
extent neutralised through automatic reductions in income-tested public pension benefits 
(Pensionskommissionen, 2015). The severity of the issues was illustrated in the spring of 
2017 by the fact that the union representing low-wage workers in the municipal sector 
(‘FOA’) threatened to withdraw its support for the further consolidation of occupational 
pension schemes, arguing that members’ contributions are largely paid in vain. 
As a response to these concerns voiced by both trade unions and the pensions industry, 
the former social democratic government appointed an expert commission to look into the 
interaction between public and occupational pensions. The commission published a 
preliminary report in January 2015, highlighting the high implicit marginal tax rates caused 
by income testing of public old-age benefits (Pensionskommissionen, 2015). However, the 
commission was closed down by the new liberal-conservative government that came into 
power in June 2015. In the spring of 2017, a broad political compromise was settled to 
increase incentives to defer retirement and improve incentives to save in the last years prior to 
retirement. At the time of writing (autumn 2017) new legislation is being prepared offering a 
tax credit to older workers saving for retirement, but there are no plans to increase the utility 
of private savings for current pensioners. 
 
Norway 
In Norway, all public sector employees are covered by relatively generous DB schemes. Since 
2006, virtually all private sector employees are similarly covered by occupational pensions, 
but the majority of these schemes are relatively meagre DC schemes that mainly take the form 
of individual savings schemes. The discrepancy between the sectors is obviously problematic, 
not the least for the LO that comprises unions organising workers from both sectors. In 
addition, the 2009 pension reform, which transformed the public pension system into a 
notional defined contribution (NDC) system of Swedish inspiration (see Christensen et al., 
2012), made the public sector DB pensions difficult to sustain in their traditional form. 
As a response both unions and policy-makers started to look for middle-of-the road 
alternatives ‘between’ DC and DB schemes – so-called hybrid schemes. The Norwegian 
notion of ‘hybrid’ schemes implies something similar to the relatively collectivistic Danish 
DC schemes, including a higher degree of risk-sharing, lifelong benefits, and including a 
possibility for employers to guarantee to link the indexation of pension rights to wage 
increases. 
Legislation allowing companies to establish hybrid pension schemes was passed in 
2014. Though such schemes are preferred by most unions over pure DC schemes, as yet they 
have achieved very limited coverage. They are mainly found among private companies that 
compete with the public sector, such as private providers of education, health care, social 
services and culture. 
The 2014 regulations for hybrid schemes did not meet LO’s wish to open the door to 
broader, industry-wide pension schemes – hybrids are still supposed to be company-specific. 
LO argues that broader schemes covering large segments of the private sector workforce will 
be more cost-efficient (due to economies of scale) and will facilitate greater risk-sharing than 
the existing company-specific schemes. In this, however, LO faces joint opposition from the 
employers’ association and the finance industry, both of which are committed to promoting a 
DC-based decentralised system. In fact, the finance industry has been running a campaign 
arguing against including pensions in national-level collective agreements. Its core argument 
is that the introduction of larger pension providers will reduce market competition (PA 
Consulting Group, 2014). 
Although LO is united in its desire to put occupational pensions on the agenda in 
central wage bargaining, there are strong tensions over the preferred nature of the schemes. 
The LO leadership, public sector unions and a range of smaller private sector unions prefer 
the establishment of broader sector-wide or industry-wide schemes that could maintain and 
strengthen the collective nature of occupational pension provision and allow for risk-sharing 
among men and women. Fellesforbundet, by contrast, questions the realism of this position 
and insists on pursuing a further individualisation of occupational pension savings (Gabler, 
2015). 
In the 2016 round of wage bargaining, these tensions came to the fore. Fellesforbundet 
was instructed by the LO to demand an increase in minimum savings, to search for solutions 
to the problem of limited portability of pension rights for mobile workers, and – 
controversially – to seek the establishment of broad, encompassing schemes. The latter 
demand was added by the representative body in LO against the will of Fellesforbundet and 
against the explicit recommendation of the LO chairman. The employers’ associations 
however refused, again, to negotiate pensions, and as a compromise the parties agreed to ask 
the government to engage in analytical work to find solutions to the problems of portability. 
This can be seen as a bid to gain time in a situation where the positions – both within LO, and 
between unions and employers’ organisations – are rather antagonistic with regard to both the 
nature and the governance of occupational schemes. 
The strong resistance of employers to negotiating occupational pensions should be 
seen in light of the fact that the social partners are already dealing with the so-called AFP 
scheme (Avtalefestet pensjon / Negotiated pension) introduced in 1988. Originally an early 
retirement scheme, AFP was transformed in 2008 to a top-up, lifelong pension supplement. 
The existence of the AFP scheme may be a partial explanation for employers’ resistance to 
negotiating occupational pensions, as they have already taken on heavy and risky obligations 
in the field, but it undermines their attempts to flag this resistance as a matter of principle. 
Conclusion 
Despite substantial differences in public pension provision between Denmark and Norway, 
there are interesting similarities in the politics of occupational pension provision over the last 
decades. In both countries, trade unions changed their views on occupational pensions from 
being highly sceptical to becoming active proponents of such schemes. In both countries, 
more or less complete coverage with DC schemes was eventually achieved, although through 
different mechanisms: collective agreements in Denmark and mandating in Norway. While 
unions in both countries have traded risk-sharing for coverage, there are important differences 
in the collective nature of DC arrangements. 
Denmark started out with far more collectivistic and solidaristic DC-schemes than 
Norway, but recent developments indicate convergence: efforts are being made in Norway to 
develop encompassing schemes more similar to the Danish ones – although progress in this 
area is slow – while calls for individual choice and a series of financial pressures have 
combined to push the Danish system in a more individualistic direction with less extensive 
risk-sharing. Even so, at the time of writing (autumn 2017), it is still the case that Danish 
unions have come closer to realising the potential for creating a fairly solidaristic system of 
occupational pensions envisaged by Trampusch (2007). 
A rather puzzling difference between the two countries concerns the position of 
employers. Danish employers have accepted including occupational pensions in collective 
wage bargaining and, during the 1990s, offered increased employer contributions in exchange 
for wage restraint from national unions. By contrast, the Norwegian employers’ associations 
have so far firmly refused to take up occupational pension demands in national-level 
collective wage bargaining (see also Trampusch, 2013). Moreover, the pension industry in 
Norway plays a role that the tradition for labour market self-regulation appears to have denied 
it in Denmark. In other words, both the player constellations and their priorities differ 
between the two countries. 
Through analysing political processes and the players’ priorities, we have been able to 
confirm some of the dynamics of incremental institutional change suggested in the literature. 
The inability of governments in both countries to update and maintain public pension systems 
in tune with changes in the surroundings – most obviously the increasing dominance of dual-
earner couples – can be seen as examples of policy drift (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).These 
developments led directly to a classic situation of layering (Streeck and Thelen, 2005), where 
critics of the status quo gave up trying to change the existing institutions and established their 
own ‘on the edges’ of the old ones. This in turn has changed the status of the old system: in 
Denmark, the wide coverage of occupational pensions has led to a multi-pillar system where 
private pensions complement public pensions. This process however, has altered the 
distributional effects of the means-testing of public pensions, and – as we have seen – its 
legitimacy is now called into question. In Norway, mandatory occupational pensions helped 
pave the way for a far more comprehensive – some will say paradigmatic – reform of the 
pension system (in 2009). 
While the processes of drift and layering are similar in the two countries, there are also 
important differences, indicating a significant degree of contextual variation and path 
dependence. Players’ priorities and scope for action can at least partially be understood in the 
light of the countries’ different industrial relations traditions and historical legacies. The 
higher union density and coverage with collective wage agreements in the private sector in 
Denmark made it possible to achieve comparatively high coverage rates without legislative 
backing. A similar approach in Norway would have left behind a significant share of private 
sector wage-earners. Obviously, the Danish self-regulation tradition also plays a role here, but 
it should not be forgotten that the Danish LO originally preferred a tripartite agreement on a 
broad occupational pension scheme for the entire private sector, supported by legislation. 
Moreover, it seems that in Denmark the collective DC schemes under the mutual control of 
the social partners opened up for a relatively rapid and flexible response to the challenges of 
increasing longevity and low interest rates. With the decentralised and strictly regulated DB 
schemes in Norway, change was harder to bring about. The financial pressures on both 
employers and providers continued to increase until a radical transition towards pure DC 
schemes became the only viable alternative for employers and life-insurers. 
Our most important finding and original contribution to the existing industrial 
relations literature is that in both countries, occupational pension politics has created strong 
tensions within the union movement. At critical junctures, key union branches have forged 
alliances with their employer counterparts and outmanoeuvred other sections of the labour 
movement. In Denmark around the 1990s, an internal struggle ended in a bitter defeat for the 
LO leadership and a fundamental change of the balance of power within the LO family in 
favour of national union branches. In Norway, there are ongoing tensions between the male-
dominated and export-oriented Fellesforbundet pushing for more decentralised and 
individualised models with a view to increasing coverage and de facto savings rates, and other 
private and public sector unions who give priority to qualitative aspects and strive to maintain 
or establish schemes under collective control and with greater risk-sharing. 
Full coverage by DC schemes has been achieved in both Norway and Denmark and 
private pensions will play a significant role in the retirement income for most pensioners – 
especially in the longer term. However, while this development is generally embraced as a 
major achievement, there are ongoing tensions and conflicts regarding the nature and the 
governance of the schemes in both countries. How should the conflict between distributional 
concerns and incentive concerns be balanced? What level of centralisation is desirable as 
regards the scope of the schemes – should they be company-specific and cater to single 
company preferences and interests or should they be industry-wide and seek to facilitate 
mobility? How should the need for individual influence and choice be balanced against the 
need for risk-sharing – including between women and men? Even in rather mature multi-pillar 
settings such as the Norwegian and the Danish ones, these issues remain controversial and 
unresolved. 
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